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Abstract: Fiscal Uncertainty, Informational Externalities 
and the Welfare Cost of Speculation 
This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of stochastic government 
budgetary policies, using a model in which private agents can devote real 
I 
resources to learn about future seigniorage. In this environment, if 
financial markets are not informationally efficient in the strong sense, 
the private return to information exceeds its social value because informed 
individuals can redistribute wealth from those who are less informed. Thus 
stochastic government policies, and seigniorage in particular, may give 
rise to socially wasteful speculative acquisition of information. 
Two specific models are used to explore the welfare costs of the 
speculative acquisition of information. The first model assumes that 
agents are identical but nevertheless trade in order to develop a simple 
framework for expositional purposes and to analyze comparative statics. 
The second model endogenizes the decision to trade by assuming that 
individuals differ with respect to the time profiles of their endowments. 
The principal results of the paper, derived by simulations, are as follows: 
First, limited heterogeneity of endowments is sufficient to generate trade 
in markets with heterogeneously informed traders. Second, the welfare 
costs of speculative acquisition of information can be surprisingly large, 
close to 1% of real GNP for realistic parameter values. Finally, expected 
increases of government spending and greater uncertainty about its 
financing both stimulate potentially wasteful acquisition of information. 
The analysis has more general implications: By specifying a channel 
through which variability of optimal government policies reduces welfare, 
it points to changes in the theory of optimal intertemporal taxation. 
Furthermore, a case is made for the analysis of policies to limit wasteful 
acquisition of information. 
1 
1. Introduction 
Trade-offs involving inflation play a central role in macroeconomics 
and international finance. A recent example of particular interest is the 
study of speculative attacks on the exchange rate. In this literature it is 
usually assumed that the authorities value a low-inflation environment (i.e. 
a fixed exchange rate system), but, at .the same time, find.it necessary to 
have a high rate of monetary growth. The conflict between these two 
policies is the source of exchange-rate crises. To gain a deeper 
understanding of these phenomena it is necessary to model explicitly why the 
monetary authorities pursue inconsistent objectives. Phelps (1973) has 
shown that seigniorage may be an essential component of an optimal tax 
policy. Building on this result Grilli (1988) shows that budgetary policies 
may be the source of collapses of fixed exchange rates. What is still left 
to be explained, however, is why the authorites would want to constrain 
their use of seigniorage by entering a fixed exchange rate system. In this 
paper we argue that discretionary use of the inflation tax engenders 
socially wasteful speculation. This analysis lays the foundation for models 
of incentive-compatible commitment to an exchange rate peg. 
We examine the welfare consequences of informational speculation in a 
simple general equilibrium macro-economic model. Speculation is a 
controversial issue and one on which public opinion and economic analysis 
often diverge. Economists generally view speculation either as a beneficial 
process for the transfer of price risks (the Keynes-Hicks view) or, 
alternatively, as unprofitable (Milgrom-Stokey (1981), Tirole (1982)). On 
the other hand, it is commonly claimed that speculation is not desirable on 
two major grounds. First, it is believed to induce instability and excess 
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volatility in market prices. Second, it is argued that since it does not 
generate wealth but only redistributes it, speculation is a wasteful 
activity from a societal point of view. 
Economists have dedicated a lot of attention to the first part of the 
argument. While Friedman (1953) forcefully defended the view that 
speculators must induce price stability, more recent results shed some 
doubts on this optimistic view (e.g. Hart and Kreps (1986)). However, 
economic analysis has been silent about the second argument which addresses 
directly some of the potential welfare consequences of speculation. The 
main reason for the lack of results in this area is the complexity of the 
models which are suited to address this type of question. We believe, 
nonetheless, that the issue is of sufficient interest and importance that it 
may be worthwhile sacrificing the elegance of models with closed form 
solutions if the reward is a first basic understanding of the problem. 
Our strategy in this work was to see whether we could construct a 
simple macro model capable of producing the popular view that speculation 
induces welfare losses. Before we describe the details of our analysis, 
however, it is necessary to be more precise about what we mean by 
speculation. The definition of speculation is perhaps as vague as its 
desirability is controversial; we do not intend to settle the argument in 
this paper. 1 We adopt the Working definition of speculation as trade on the 
basis of differential information because it allows us to capture the 
General discussion of the nature of speculation can be found in 
Hirshleifer (1975), Feiger (1976) and Tirole (1982). 
1 
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popular perception of speculation as wasteful. Thus speculators, in this 
paper, are individuals who trade in asset markets on the basis of superior 
information. The collection, processing and evaluation of information is a 
costly activity. It is socially beneficial if it facilitates a superior 
allocation of real resources. Even if socially worthless, however, the 
acquisition of costly information may nevertheless be privately-profitable 
if it allows speculators to redistribute wealth from less well informed 
individuals. The preliminary results reported here indicate that 
speculation is likely to occur only if information is surprisingly cheap, 
but, if it does occur, may be quite costly. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: We start with an explanation of 
the equilibrium concept used, and relate it to other equilibrium concepts 
for models with heterogeneously informed traders. Next we analyze a simple 
representative agent model, in which uncertainty derives from stochastic 
budgetary policies. We show that this model is able to deliver the result 
that speculation is welfare reducing and analyze how changes in the 
environment affect speculative activity. We argue, however, that the model 
can be criticized on the basis of internal inconsistency, following an 
argument similar to Tirole's (1982). The problem is that in a world of 
identical agents, there are no gains from trade, so that rational agents 
should refrain from trading altogether. We then extend the model by 
introducing heterogeneity in the form of different time profiles of 
endowments. This generates gains from trade, thus removing the potential 
inconsistency. We show that the conclusions from the simpler model are not 
affected: speculation may still be costly in welfare terms. 
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2. The Modelling Strategy 
There exists a considerable body of work on the properties of rational 
expectations equilibria in markets with heterogeneously informed traders 
(Green (1973), Grossman (1976, 1977, 1981), Radner (1979) and Jordan and 
Radner (1982)). An important insight of this literature dating back to 
Lucas (1972) and explored in detail by Grossman (1977, 1981), Hellwig (1979) 
and others, 2 is that prices aggregate and convey the heterogeneous 
thereby providing traders with the opportunityinformation in the economy, 
to learn about other agents' private information. Prices need not reveal 
information perfectly, but if they do profitable speculation is impossible 
and, as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have shown, a rational expectations 
equilibrium may not exist if the collection of information is costly. 
Generally, the incentive to acquire costly information is smaller the more 
perfectly prices reveal information. 
In this paper, we assume that informed individuals not only have more 
precise knowledge on future realizations of at least some random variables 
in the model' but also are able- to derive information from contemporaneous 
price observations; that is, they form expectations rationally as the 
concept is commonly understood. Uninformed agents, on the other hand, are 
assumed to be unable to extract information from currently observed prices 
theirand are consequently restricted to forming expectations conditional on 
endowments. This scenario crudely captures the notion that interpreting 
price data is costly, although of course not (as we assume), infinitely so. 
Further references can be found in Grossman (1981), Jordan and Radner 
(1982) and Admati (1985). 
2 
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We implicitly assume that the cost of interpreting price data exceeds that 
of acquiring information about future states of nature directly, otherwise 
existence problems similar to those noted by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
would arise. Our model therefore exaggerates the extent of speculation 
compared to the results from a rational expectations equilibrium model. 
These informational assumptions are·analytically convenient in·that 
they yield a reasonably tractable general equilibrium model in which asset 
markets are not informationally efficient in the strong sense, so that 
individuals will have an incentive to acquire costly information. In this 
our analysis follows most closely that of Hellwig (1982) who shows that an 
economy in which agents condition on past prices (but know the model of the 
economy) approaches full informational efficiency without destroying 
individuals' incentive to acquire information, as the interval between 
"market days" shrinks. 
The alternative equilibrium concept for models with heterogeneously 
informed agents, noisy rational expectations equilibrium, as popularized by 
Lucas (1972), Grossman (1976, 1981) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is 
difficult to apply in a multi-period general equilibrium setting. In fact, 
the restrictive assumptions on the distributions of asset returns employed 
to derive closed-form solutions in single-period CAPM-models fail to hold, 
thereby robbing these models of their attractive simplicity. Furthermore, 
the rational expectations equilibrium approach has, as Hellwig (1982) and 
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1987) have pointed out, the undesirable 
feature of requiring market participants to act on information which is 
produced by their collective actions. 
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3. A Representative Agent Model 
We consider a two-period economy populated by a continuum of consumers 
who have identical preferences and endowments but may choose, in the manner 
outlined below, different information sets. Specifically, individuals 
derive utility from consumption and real money holdings 3 in both periods of 
their lives. They receive (exogenously determined) endowments of .goods.in 
each period. Money enters the economy as a result of government budget 
deficits which may be in part attributable to lump-sum nominal transfers to 
consumers. To simplify the analysis we assume logarithmic utility 
functions. Finally we assume that agents have free access to a credit 
market in which nominal bonds are traded. 
Before markets open in the first period a consumer may choose to become 
"informed" at a cost K in terms of first-period goods. That is by 
becoming informed the individual observes some future random variables with 
greater precision and obtains the ability to extract information from 
contemporaneous price observations. To simplify the analysis we shall 
assume that all informed individuals have the same information set, as do 
all uninformed agents. The cost of becoming informed, K, can be interpreted 
as the fixed cost in terms of real income foregone, of time invested in data 
acquisition and processing. We model the cost of becoming informed as a 
fixed cost to reflect the set-up costs in acquiring information; in more 
general models one would expect the cost of information to have both a fixed 
component and a component which is increasing in the precision of the 
The utility of money holdings is derived, in the manner of McCallum 
(1983) and Feenstra(1986), from the transactions motive for holding money. 
3 
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information. In addition we assume that moral hazard problems preclude the 
sharing of information. 
A formal statement of the decisio~ problems of representative informed 
and uninformed individuals serve to summarize the preceding discussion. 




(3.2) Ct+ mt+ 
and 
bi 
(3.3) (1 + Rt)~+ 
t+l 
i i iwhere c , m, and b denote consumption, real money holdings and holdings of 
private nominal bonds (with face value equal to that of one unit of 
currency), while P , Y, T, and V denote the price level, the 
individual's endowment of goods, lump-sum taxes levied by the government and 
lump-sum nominal transfers from the government. Finally, EI denote t 
expectations conditional on period t endowment information and the 
information set of an informed individual respectively, while 7I - 1, 7U - 0 
\ 
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and the assumption that the policy variables G (per capita exhaustive 
government spending), T, and V are exogenously determined. Individuals 
are assumed to know the joint distribution of the exogenous endowment 
variables Yt' M and policy variables.Yt+l' t-1 
The conditions which must be satisfied in equilibrium are two-fold. 
First, those which determine equilibrium prices and allocations for 
arbitrary values of information costs, K, and proportion of individuals 
engaged in speculation, A. Second, that which determines, for given K 
the equilibrium fraction of the population informed, A * such that the ex' 
ante expected utilities of speculators and uninformed individuals are equal. 
Formally, for given cost of information, K, and fraction of individuals 
who speculate, A, an equilibrium is defined as a vector of prices and 
. (R p p U U U U I I I I ) whi"ch 
a11ocat1ons, t' t' t+l' ct, ct+l' mt' mt+l' ct, ct+l' mt, mt+l 






where we have used Walras' law to eliminate the bond market in period t 
and the money market in period t+l. Let u1 and UU denote the ex post 
utility, in equilibrium, of representative informed and uninformed 
individuals, for given). and K, i.e. 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
and define the ex ante expected net benefit of being informed,~. as 
I U 
(3.11) = E[U ()., K, ... ) -U ()., K, ... )]. 
Then, for any given K the equilibrium proportion of individuals informed, 
). * (Yt, Gt' Tt' Mt-l' Vt, Yt+l' Gt+l' Tt+l' Vt+l' K) , satisfies 
(3.12) ~().* K, ... ) ... 0, 0 < ).* < 1,' 
.X* 1 if~()., K, ... ) > 0, 0 :S .X :S 1, and 
).* 0 if~()., K, ... ) < 0, 0:S).:S 1 . 
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Ye shall from now on simplify the analysis by assuming that the 
financing of government spending in period t+l is the sole source of 
uncertainty in the model and that the government does not pay nominal 
transfers to individuals. This allows us to address a matter of 
considerable topical interest (as of November 1987): the relationship 
between uncertainty about the financing of government spending-and 
speculation in financial markets. Also we assume that by becoming informed, 
an individual removes uncertainty completely. A further assumption, adopted 
purely for analytical convenience, is that the distribution of future 
government behavior with respect to taxation and seigniorage is such as to 
generate a uniform distribution of money growth rates. 
4. The Social Cost of Speculation 
The nature of the information externality characterizing speculation is 
illustrated most clearly by the comparison of equilibrium allocations in the 
polar cases when everyone and no one, respectively, is informed. This 
comparison yields an upper bound for the social cost of speculation, since 
it does not take into account the endogenous determination of the number of 
speculators. 
The first-order conditions for expected utility maximization for a 
representative individual i (i - I, U) , are 
Q(4.1) -y- Si t 
ct 
1-a ir~+lpt6i(4.2) --- -Ei t t pt+lmt 
11 
t 
rpSi (1 + R )Ei t+l t(4.3) -
t t Pt+l 
~a. i(4.4) andi - Sj, t+l' 
c. t+l
J' 
~(1-a) i(4.5) S. t+l'i J' m. t+l
J' 
as well as the budget constraints, equations (3.2) and (3.3), where S~ and 
iSt+l are Lagrange multipliers, and j indexes period-t+l states of nature. 
Consider first the case where no one speculates (A - 0) . Since 
individuals are assumed to form expectations about period t+l outcomes 
rationally, we first solve for the equilibrium in period t+l: 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
{fa and(4.8) (1 )Y ' - gt+l t+l 
UU (~ Mt+l(4.9) pt+l - 1~ _(_l___g__)_Y__ ' 
t+l t+l 
or, using the government budget constraint, 
(4.10) 
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where g and rare government spending and tax rates and a superscript "UU" 
indicates the equilibrium value of a variable when everyone is uninformed. 
The rate of monetary growth resulting from tax and spending rates rt+l and 
(4.11) 
Similarly, in period t 
uu
(4.12) C t "" (1 - gt)Yt, 
(4.13) m
uu ... ct, and[~[1:~ 
uu
l uu t 
t 
=-(4.14) Puu 
t l-a 1 + R~ l - gt .[~[ [~ 
Using equation (4.3) the equilibrium nominal interest rate in period tis 
(4.15) 
These results yield the realized utility of a representative individual when 
everyone is uninformed as 
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uu u(4.16) U - U (0, K, ... ) 
log Yt + /3 log Yt+l + log(l - gt) + /3 log(l - gt+l) 
1
+ (l+p)(l-<><)log[ ;] + (1-<><)lo+ + PE~[l ! ,.J]-
The derivation of equilibrium allocations when everyone is informed 
about future government financing policies is analogous to the foregoing, 
and results in ex post utility for a representative individual 
II I
(4.17) U = U (1, K, ... ) = log Yt + {Jlog yt+l + log(l - gt - k) 
+ Plog(l - gt+l) + (l+p)(l-<><)log[
1
,:"] + (1-<><)log[l + p(1!,.J] 
where k = K/Yt' the cost of information as a fraction of per capita GNP. 
It is clear that a social planner who tries to maximize the expected 
lifetime utility of a representative consumer would prefer the equilibrium 
in which no one is engaged in speculative information acquisition, since the 
social cost of speculation in this benchmark case is given by 
UU II
(4.18) E[U (0, K, ... ) -U (1, K, ... )] - log(l - gt) - log(l - gt -k) 
+ (l~)log[l + {3E(1 ! µ )] - (l~)E log[l + /3(1 ! µ ]] , 
t t 
which is positive because k > 0 and by the concavity of log(·). 4 Society 
as a whole does not gain from being informed, because the returns to 
4 For equation (4.18) to hold more generally when additional variables are 
stochastic, µt should be independent of variables known in period t. 
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speculation are purely redistributive. As a result, the investment in 
information represents a net loss. Note, however, that even if information 
about future monetary growth could be obtained costlessly, society would be 
better off if everyone were uninformed. The reason is that different money 
growth realizations (µt) , although neutral in period t+l, induce 
variations in period t ·equilibrium per capita real money holdings if they 
are observed in period t. Since individuals are risk averse, such 
variations are undesirable ex ante, although optimal ex post. That is, 
seigniorage is a lump-sum tax only when it is unanticipated. Similar points 
have previously been made by Weiss (19 ) and King (1984). 
5. Equilibrium Speculation 
In this section we analyz,e in greater detail the equilibrium of the 
model under the assumption that speculators observe future taxation (and, by 
implication, seigniorage), while uninformed individuals cannot extract 
speculators' privileged information from observed market prices. 
The derivation of agents' equilibrium allocations for arbitrary A and 
K proceeds as before. The commodity market equilibrium conditions and the 
first-order conditions which govern the allocation of resources to 
consumption and money holdings yield the equilibrium price level in periods 




Thus, the average value of per capita endowments (i.e. consumption good plus 
real balances) in period t is 
(5.3) 
those of speculators and uninformed individuals fall short of and exceed 
this amount by (1-Ak)Yt and AkYt' respectively. Denote by 8! the 
consumption share of per capita disposable income of a representative 
individual in group i Then 
the real bond holdings of the informed and uninformed in period tare 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 




, and8t+l l+~l 
- 81 
t 1 - g - Akt 
1(5.8) u -8u + alk-1+~18t+l + µt t 1 - gt - Ak . 
Assuming that per capita income in period tis known to all, the first-order 
conditions, equations (4.1), (4.3) and (4.4), can be rewritten as 
16 
(5.9) 





(5.12) 1 == ~log 1 + µ + Rt (1 -8 tU _ { + 1 - gt - >.k)}
8t µ-e_ 
u
- log{l + I:..+ Rt(1 -8 t + 1 -
a>. 
gt - Ak)]} 
where, to derive equation (5.12), we used the properties of the uniform 
distribution. 5 Finally, the net private value of information about future 
government policy can be expressed in terms of ratios of consumption shares: 
I U
(5.13) 1/J(>., K, ... ) == E{log 8t(>., k, ... ) - log 8t(>.
, k, ... ) 
+ p[log 8~+1 (>., k, ... ) -
log 8~+1(>., k, ... )]} 
- 1/J(>., k, gt gt+l) ' 
where 1/J(·) is contingent upon the particular distributional assumption on 
5 Note that even if future endowments were uncertain it would still be 
possible to describe agent's decisions solely in terms of policy variables. 
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To establish the existence of an equilibrium fraction of the population 
engaged in speculation, A* , we only need to show that j(•) is continuous in 
all its arguments for all A E [0,1]. Continuity may fail for three reasons: 
The first is the free-i:'ider problem that arises when uninformed individuals 
can perfectly infer the information of informed traders from prices. The 
resulting discontinuity identified by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) does not 
occur in our model since we've ruled out perfect revelation by assumption. 
Hart (1974) has pointed out that an equilibrium need not exist in models 
with incomplete asset markets. Existence fails when heterogeneously 
informed individuals take off-setting infinite long and short positions, 
with the result that their budget sets are not compact and their excess 
demands, therefore, not well-defined. Since our model includes only money 
and bonds this situation could only arise if a single individual were to 
take an infinite long position in money matched by an infinite short 
position in bonds. Such a position would violate the individual's 
intertemporal budget constraint, because bonds dominate money in return. 
Finally, to ensure feasibility for all possible values of A, the cost of 
information is restricted to not exceed per capita disposable GNP, i.e. 
k < 1 - gt. For any A and k satisfying this restriction the existence of an 
equilibrium follows by standard methods. 
Since the utility function is continuously differentiable, ex post 
utilities, and hence j(A, k, ... ) , are continuous and differentiable in A 
and k (Mas-Collel (1985), pp. 197-201). Consequently there exists at least 
one A* satisfying equation (3.12). Note that this result does not depend 
on the particular utility function chosen (it would hold for any strictly 
concave twice continuously differentiable utility function satisfying the 
18 
Inada ~onditions) or the specification of the nature and sources of 
uncertainty in the model. The restriction that the cost of information be 
smaller than per capita disposable GNP is also, in our opinion, quite 
innocuous. 6 The equilibrium social cost of speculation (allowing A to adjust 
to its equilibrium value A)* is given by: 
where Rt(A* , k, ... ) is the equilibrium nominal interest rate when A* of the 
population speculates. 
The net private value of information when no one is informed, 
~(O, k, ... ), can be derived explicitly, and provides some insight into the 
relative cost of information required for speculation not to occur. 
Substituting A= 0 into equation (5.13) and using the fact that a single 
trader has no influence on the market 
Alternatively one could, by restricting the range of A, consider 




(5.15) ,(,(0, k, ... ) - E{(l+p)log{l - l~t + P(l + pt)E(1 ! ,.J} 
! ,.J}- (l+P) log(l+P) - p log(l + pt) - p log E (1 
which is positive for sufficiently small values of k. 
Since it is not possible, in general, to derive closed form-solutions 
for the consumption share of uninformed individuals, Ot,
u and the net value 
of information, ~(A, k, ... ), we report simulation results below. 
Alternatively, some intuition can be gained by approximating the equilibrium 
to derive upper and lower bounds for the consumption share of the 
uninformed. Thus, by using the "log(l+x) = x"-approximation or by ignoring 
Jensen's inequality in equation (5.12), it can be shown that 
(5.16) 
lU ~ l+~ aAk 
3(5.17) 61t I+i9l l + Rt + 1 - gt - Ak ' 
is the desired consumption share of an individual who always overestimates 
the real interest rate by assuming that the rate of monetary growth will 
equal its lower bound, and 
(5.18) 
Corresponding to ou 1t and o
u 
2
t are lower and upper bounds for the equilibrium 
nominal interest rate, Rlt and R2t, such that 
20 
(5.19) 
As can be expected, if the uninformed underestimate the rate of monetary 
growth the equilibrium nominal interest rate is lower than it would 
otherwise have been, while R2t exceeds 
the true equilibrium interest rate 
because it is based on an underestimate of the uninformed's expected 
marginal utility of future consumption. It is clear that speculators 
redistribute income from the uninformed by borrowing in periods where the 
rate of monetary growth is high and vice versa. The benefits of 
redistribution are moderated by the fact that speculators hold more money 
balances in high inflation periods, that is, they "pay" proportionately more 
of the seigniorage tax. 
The approximations show that increased speculation, as measured by the 
proportion of the population acquiring information, A, increases interest­
rate volatility. This contradicts Friedman's (1953) assertion that 
profitable speculation must stabilize prices. The intuition underlying our 
result is straightforward: If no one is informed, future policy 
realizations do not affect current outcomes, while, in an economy with 
speculators, an increase in the proportion of speculators increases the 
impact of future policies on current prices. Hart and Kreps (1986) have 
shown that profitable speculation may also destabilize prices in an 
environment similar to that envisaged by Friedman. 
6. Comparative Statics 
The response of the equilibrium proportion of the population engaged in 
speculation to changes in information technology (relative to per capita 
21 
income) and in government policies are of considerable interest. To derive 
these comparative statics results we consider, in turn, the effects of 
changes ink,>., gt' gt+l and (µ-1') (for given gt) on the net benefit of 
information. Note that the comparative statics results derived here apply 
to interior equilibria, such that 0 < >.* < 1, only. 
It is expositionally convenient to start with a.change ·in the.relative 
cost of information, say a decrease brought about by either an improvement 
in information technology or an increase in per capita income. From the 
definition of ~( ... ) and the commodity market equilibrium condition we 
have 
(6 .1) 
That is, we need to evaluate the effects of changes ink on the equilibrium 
consumption shares of an informed individual. Since the value of a 
speculator's endowment in period t relative to the economy-wide average, 
given by 
-1 
(6.2) - gt - >.k) ' } 
is increased by a reduction ink, his desired consumption shares in both 




Thus o! and o!+l increase while 0~ and O~+l decrease if redistribution and 
intertemporal substitution effects engendered by the change in the 
equilibrium interest rate do not outweigh the initial wealth effects. This 
anrequires stability of equilibrium, that is that aggregate saving be 
aincreasing function of Rt. If this condition is satisfied, decrease ink 
i.e.increases the net value of being informed in every state of nature, 
lj,k < 0. 
Next consider an increase in the fraction of the population engaged in 
speculation. Using the commodity market equilibrium conditions as before: 
(6 .4) 
An increase in A has two effects: It raises, ceteris paribus, the value of 
the endowments (relative to the economy-wide average) of speculators and 
uninformed individuals alike, thereby raising the desired consumption shares 
of representative individuals in both groups. In the aggregate the increase 
in the proportion of the population engaged in speculation reinforces this 
increase in demand by speculators while reversing, at least in part, the 
OU canincrease in demand by uninformed individuals. As a result 0t
I and t 
both increase or either can increase at the expense of the other. 
Thus, in sum, since none of the terms of lj,A can be signed 
unambiguously, the existence of multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out on a 
priori grounds. This result is confirmed by the simulation exercise reported 
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on in the next section. The equilibria are easily Pareto-i':anked, however, 
with smaller values of A * corresponding to higher welfare. The following 
comparative static statements refer to the equilibrium corresponding to the 
lowest value of A* (which would be stable if A were to adjust in 
tattonement-like fashion). 
Given the caveat stated we conclude that a decrease in the.cost-of 
information would increase the proportion of the population engaged in 
speculative acquisition of information. The resource cost of speculation, 
as a fraction of per capita income, A* ·k, may increase or decrease depending 
on the elasticity of A* with respect to k. The relevant conceptual 
experiment in this case is to consider the effect on~( ... ) of a change ink 
accompanied by a change in A such that A•k is unchanged. Once again the 
results are inconclusive, but the simulations prove instructive. 
Four different government policy experiments are of interest. These 
are changes in current government spending (gt)' changes in expected 
future government spending (gt+l)' permanent changes in government spending 
(gt and gt+l) and, finally, changes in the distribution of future taxes 
which increase uncertainty about monetary growth. An increase in current 
government spending, as can be seen from equations (6.3) and (6.4), is 
analogous to an increase ink, and consequently lowers the value of 
information. Intuitively, it reduces both the resources available for 
information acquisition and for potential redistribution. The other changes 
in government policies involve changes in the distribution of rates of 
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monetary growth. 7 It is well known (Gould (1974), Laffont (1976)) that there 
is no unambiguous relationship between the value of information and changes 
in the distributions of the underlying sources of uncertainty. The 
simulation results presented in the next section are nevertheless 
intuitively appealing. 
7. Simulation Results 
Simulation results for the model are presented in Figures 7.1 to 7.10. 
8 
Figures 7.1 to 7.4 illustrate the value of information,~. the equilibrium 
fraction of the population engaged in speculation, l*, and the equilibrium 
output loss due to information acquisition, l*·k, for a benchmark 
parameterization of the model. The implications of alternative government 
policies are explored in Figures 7.5 to 7.8, and, finally, Figures 7.9 and 
7.10 summarize the effects of variations in the "deep structural parameters" 
a and /J. 
1 We will generally assume that the distribution of taxes changes as well 
so that we can limit our attention to changes in the parameters of the 
distribution. 
8 The methodology is straightforward: For each set of parameter values (a, 
{J, l, k, gt' gt+l' M, µ) the model, appropriately modified for discreteµ, 
is solved for a hundred possible values of µt using a GAUSS procedure based 
on Broyden's secant method. The solutions are used to calculate the 
corresponding net benefit of being informed,~- Finally, for each set of 
parameters (a, /J, k, gt' gt+l' M, µ), the equilibrium fraction of 
speculators, l * , is chosen so as to set~ appropriately close to zero. 
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The benchmark parameter values were chosen so as to approximate those 
for western industrial economies. In particular government spending was 
assumed to equal 25% of GNP (gt gt+l - 0.25), the maximum government 
budget deficit to be financed by printing money to equal 2.5% of GNP 
(0 s gt+l - Tt+l s 0.025), and the discount factor, p, to equal 0.97. If 
"money" in this model is interpreted as nominally denominated government 
liabilities a value of 0.95 would be appropriate for a. Alternatively if 
"money" is high-powered money a should be about 0.995. We chose the former 
value for the benchmark model. 
Two conclusions are immediately apparent from the simulations of the 
benchmark model: First, specula:tion only occurs at relatively low levels of 
information costs. Individuals speculate only if the cost of acquiring 
interior equilibria ininformation is less 1.6% of per capita GNP. Second, 
which a proper fraction of the population speculates, occur for a small 
subset of parameter values only; in this case at values of the cost of 
A direct consequenceinformation between 1.5% and 1.6% of per capita GNP. 
of this property of the model is that the output loss due to speculative 
acquisition of information may be surprisingly high. This is illustrated in 
Figure 7.4 which shows that the output cost of speculation increases in the 
cost of information to reach a maximum of 1.5% of aggregate output and falls 
off rapidly at higher levels of information costs as the fraction of the 
population engaged in speculation declines to zero when K equals 1.6% of per 
capita income. Also note that multiple interior (in l) equilibria do 
arearise--the Pareto-dominated equilibria and the associated output costs 
shown by the dashed lines in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. 
We attribute the result that in most equilibria either every one or no 
one is engaged in acquisition of information-.to the assumptions that agents 
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are identical and that the cost of acquiring information is fixed. The fact 
that speculation only occurs at very low levels of information costs can be 
interpreted as pointing to the need for models of the sharing of 
information. A particularly interesting extension would be to view 
financial institutions, especially institutional investors, as coalitions 
formed.to spread the costs of information and thereby to avoid 
redistributive losses in the financial markets. 
Figure 7.5 confirms that increases in current government spending, g, . t 
lowers the net value of information by decreasing the resources available 
for redistribution and increasing the opportunity cost of becoming informed. 
An (expected) increase in future government spending, gt+l' on the other 
hand, if it is not necessarily accompanied by increased taxes, raises the 
mean rate of monetary growth and widens the range of possible rates of 
monetary growth, thereby raising the net value of information. This is 
illustrated in Figure 7.6. Figure 7.7 combines these two conceptual 
experiments to show that information is more valuable in economies with 
higher constant rates of government spending out of GNP. The effects of 
increased uncertainty about the financing of future government spending is 
shown in Figure 7.8. 9 The diagram confirms our _intuition that greater 
uncertainty about future government policies would raise the value of 
information. 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show how the simulation results depend on the deep 
structural parameters of the model, a and~. a can be interpreted as 
9 (Specifically the distribution of future tax rates is varied so as to 
increase 'ji and decrease M by equal amounts and thus to generate a 
meanmean-preserving spread of possible rates of monetary growth around a 
rate of 0.75.) 
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parameterizing the transactions technology of the economy, with an increased 
value of a associated with a more efficient transactions 
technology. An increase in a has two effects: First, it raises, ceteris 
paribus, the first-period price level, thereby reducing the value of initial 
endowments of money and, consequently, raising the relative cost of 
information and reducing its net value. Second, it raises the rate of 
monetary growth associated with any second-period government budget deficit, 
thus extending the right-hand side tail of the distribution of rates of 
monetary growth resulting from a given level of government spending and 
distribution of tax rates. This latter effect raises the value of 
information, and, as seen in Figure 7.9, dominates the first-period 
endowment effect. Finally, since the cost of acquiring information is 
incurred in the first period, an increase in the representative consumer's 
pure rate of time preference (decrease in P) lowers the net value of 
information as shown in Figure 7.10. 
8. A Model with Heterogeneous Agents 
In the previous analysis we implicitly assumed that all agents always 
enter the credit market. Notice, however, that uninformed individuals will 
always be better off if they do not borrow or lend. This is the case 
because there are no gains from trade in a representative agent model. In 
situations like this, as Tirole (1982) has shown, speculative markets do not 
exist. However, as we will show in this section, the welfare costs of 
speculation do not crucially depend on uninformed agents behaving against 
their own interest. Ye, therefore, see the representative agent model as a 
useful approximation to a more complete model which explicitly accounts for 
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gains from trade and uninformed individuals' decision whether to trade or 
not. 
assumesThe complete model, which is analyzed in detail in Appendix B, 
that individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their endowment profiles. 
Specifically, we separate the population into equal~ized groups of type-A 
..and type-B individuals. Type-A individuals receive endowments of 
commodities in period t and t+l which, respectively, exceed and fall short 
of the economy-wide endowment by a fraction 6. Type-B individuals' 
endowment profiles are the mirror image of those of type-A's and both groups 
receive identical endowments of nominal money and pay the same taxes. 
Information is socially valuable in this setting because we restrict 
That is, information substitutes,individuals to trading nominal bonds. 
albeit imperfectly, for indexed contracts. The social value of information 
is easily calculated as the average of the premia which type-A and type-B 
a fullyindividuals are willing to pay for a change from an uninformed to 
informed economy: Let EUi,II denote the expected utility of a 
representative individual of type i if everyone is informed and the 
. i uu 
individual pays the premium ai in period t, and let EU' denote the 
expected utility of a type-i individual when no one is informed. Then the 
social value of information, measured in terms of period t goods, is given 
by 
!.t A * (8.1) a* 2'a 
A* 







' aB)-EU_B,UU(Yt, Y G G M o) t+l' t' t+l' t-1' 
Equations (8.2) and (8.3) emphasize that our measure of the value of 
information is a general equilibrium one which requires coordination of 
individual decisions by a social planner. Clearly speculation is 
potentially socially beneficial in this model: it moves the equilibrium 
fully informednominal interest rate towards that which would prevail in a 
economy, thereby compensating in part for the inefficiency brought about by 
the absence of indexed contracts. 
The decision whether to trade intertemporally or not, could in 
principle be separated into decisions pertaining to trade in the bond market 
and trade in the money market. To simplify the analysis we shall assume 
that individuals who refrain from intertemporal trade simply hold their 
initial endowments of money and that the government does not create money in 
period t. 10 
Let AA and AB denote the fractions of type-:t\ and type-B individuals 
who speculate and, similarly, let uA and uB be the fractions of individuals 
w Although individuals who do not trade intertemporally simply consume 
their endowments of the consumption good, we can justify their holding money 
by assuming that they trade the constituent parts of a composite consumption 
good and hold money for that purpose. 
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who refrain from trading. q 
A 
• uB and cost of information, 
kYt, let EU'
i NT denote the expected utility in 
equilibrium of representative individuals of type i , i - A, B, who 
speculate, are uninformed but nevertheless trade, and refrain from trade. 






• k, ... ) • EUi,S -EUi,U, i - A, B, 





' k, ... ) i - A, B, 





' k, ... ) a EUi' S - EUi 'NT, i - A, B. 
An equilibrium is defined as a set of prices, allocations and proportions of 
i* i*
individuals of both types who speculate and refrain from trade, A and u 
i - A, B, such that individuals are maximized on their budget sets, 
markets clear. That is, 
B) B,U(8.7) - q C t 
for the goods market in period t, 
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(8.8) 
· lA B lA B
for the money market in period t (where u - 2'u + u) and A - 2'A +A)) 
(8.9) 
for the goods market in period t+l, and 
,i* - 1 1.·f .~i(,i, ,j*, 0 j* ) 0 f 11 ,i (0 l] and" y, " " , u , . . . > or a " e , 
. "* , 0 J.* ) > 0 dr 1. (1, ", J , u , . . . , an 
.* . i* 
q 















i* , . . . ) < 0 f or a11 .,~l. _< 1 - 'l. 
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where the inequality holds if A
i* 0, for i, j - A, B, i ,. j . 
It is interesting to note that our model provides an explanation for 
the well-documented excess sensitivity of consumption to current income 
(Flavin (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982)). In this case excess sensitivity 
results not from liquidity constraints, but from both potential borrowers 
and lenders refraining from trade with· possibly better-informed individuals. 
To provide an output-based measure of the welfare costs of speculation 
we consider the amount which individuals would pay to move from a 
speculative to an uninformed equilibrium. Operationally we compute it by 
subtracting the previously defined value of information a* from the average 
amount, d,* which individuals in a fully informed equilibrium would be 
willing to pay to avoid a speculative equilibrium. Formally, d* is given by 
(8.12) 
i - A, B. 
The most striking result to emerge from simulations of this model is 
that limited heterogeneity (in the context of a two-period model) is 
sufficient to produce results which are qualitatively similar to those 
33 
obtained in the representative agent model with agents "forced" to trade. 11 
For example, if S - 0.1 (i.e. individuals experience endowments 10% above 
and below average per capita income) everyone speculates if information 
costs less than 1.1% of per capita income. If the cost of information 
exceeds 2.31% of per capita GNP no one speculates and fork between these 
values interior equilibria (in ). 's and u' s) occur .. At this level of 
heterogeneity the social value of information, a,* is 0.33% of per capita 
GNP. 
Table 8.1 reproduces some of the interior equilibria, expenditures on 
acquisition of information and the excess burden of speculation, defined as 
(d* - a)* and expressed as a percentage of per capita GNP. As could be 
expected, the excess burden of speculation exceeds the expenditures on 
information in interior equilibria because it takes into account, inter 
alia, the welfare losses engendered when some individuals refrain from 
trading. Similarly the expenditures on information exceed the excess burden 
of speculation when everyone speculates. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued that redistributive speculation based on 
costly information is characterized by an informational externality. We 
analyzed a simple macroeconomic model in which bond market speculation of 
this nature occurs because of uncertainty about the financing of government 
spending. 
11 The assumed parameter values are as follows: a - 0.95, fJ - l, 
gt - gt+l - 0.25 and rt+l is assumed to vary between 0.225 and 0.25. 
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In this setting we demonstrated the existence of an equilibrium in 
· which an endogenously determined fraction of the population is engaged in 
speculative acquisition of information. We illustrated and characterized 
the equilibrium social cost of speculation. Comparative statics results are 
complicated by the existence of multiple equilibria in which propera 
fraction of the population speculates. 
Simulation exercises designed to complement the analytical results 
indicate that speculation will only occur if information is relatively 
cheap, but, if it does occur, may be surprisingly costly. We interpret 
these results as indicative of the need to model the role of financial 
institutions as coalitions designed to spread information costs over large 
numbers of individuals. 
The simple representative agent model which we have used for much of 
the analysis is subject to criticism because it assumes that uninformed 
individuals trade when it is not in their interest to do so. We have shown, 
however, that conclusions drawn from it match closely those from a more 
complete model with heterogeneous agents in which information is valuable 
and uninformed individuals are free not to trade. We, therefore, interpret 
the simple representative agent model as a convenient vehicle for 
comparative statics exercises. 
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TABLE 8 
A* A* B* B* * * * * k .X .X .X •k d -a a" " 
2.3 0 0 1.3 0 0.015 0.025 0.33 
2.2 0 0 21.83 0 0.24 0.37 0.33 
2.1 0 0 52.2 47.8 0.547 0. 72 0.33 
2.0 0 0 54.5 45.5 0.545 0.71 0.33 
1.8 0 0 60.15 39.85 0.541 0.705 0.33 
1.5 0 0 71.1 28.9 0.533 0.70 0.33 
1.3 65.5 34.5 57.5 42.5 0.80 0.923 0.33 
1.1 100.0 0 100.0 0 1.1 0.769 0.33 
A* A* B* B*.X , , .X and" are expressed as percentages of the type-A and~" 
populations. .X * •k and d*- a * are expressed as percentages of per capita 
income in period t. 
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APPENDIX A 
The derivatives discussed in Section 6 are as follows: That 8I t 
decreasing ink is shown by 
(A.1) 
I U






The effect of a change in A on 8t is given by 
u 
(1->.)ak(l - gt - k){8 t ( I 
(A.3) --z -------- -- - 8 +{ R (1 - g - Ak/ l+,8 t l 
t t 
+ _1_ t I _ U _ A (1-Aak ~ O1 + µ [8 8 (~ 2 





The response of Ot+l is similarly indeterminate: 
I
dOt+l (1-A)ak J
(A.4) dA 1 - g -At 
I I
but likely to be positive. In general Ot and Ot+l are likely to move in 
opposite directions in response to a change in A; an increase in Rt is 
necessary for o! to decrease and sufficient for e!+l to increase. Finally, 
(A. 5) 
Equations (A.3) to (A.5) lead to the statement in the text. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Model with Heterogeneous Agents 
Consider the equilibrium which arises when fractions AA and AB of 
type-A and type-B agents, respectively, speculate and fractions uA and uB 
refrain from trade. The optimization problem of a type-A speculator is 
(B.1) 
(B.2) 
A,S A,S y (l c:) T (l R ) __:i_bA,S A,S pt(B.3) ct+l + mt+l - t+l ""'ti - t+l + + t Pt+l t + mt . Pt+l' 
while that of a type-A uninformed trader is 
(B.4) Max mf,U - a 
A,U A,U bA,U 




(B.6) cA,U + mA,U - y (1-o) - Tt+l + (1 + Rt) ___!_bA,U + mA,U. 
t+l t+l t+l . Pt+l t t Pt+l 
where b now denotes real bond holdings. Finally, type-t\ individuals who 
refrain from trading solve 
(B.7) 
+ QEAt,NT{a 1 cA,NT + (1 )1 A,NT} b" /J og t+l -a og mt+l su Ject to 
(B.8) 
A,NT Mt-1
(B.9) m - -- and 
t pt 
A,NT A,NT y (l-o) T Mt-1(B.10) ct+l + mt+l - t+l - t+l + -p--.
t+l 
The optimization problems for type-B individuals are identical to those of 
type A individuals, but with Yt(l-o) and Yt+l(l+o) replacing Yt (l+o) and 
Yt+l(l-o) in the budget constraints. The government budget constraints are 
as before. 
1 A B 1 A B
Let A• f{A +A) and u • f<u + u) and, as before, K - kYt, Gt -
gtYt and Gt+l - gt+lyt+l; then the market-clearing conditions are 
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- 2Y (1 - g - Ak) - aAy (1 + 6 - g ) - aBYt(l - 6 - g t )t t t t 
for the goods market in period t, 
for the money market in period t, and 
+ (1 - AB B) B, U 2Y (1 )- a ct+l - t+l - gt+l 
for the goods market in period t+l. From the first-order conditions of 
agents who trade we have: 
(1:°) [1 R+tRt] cti ,j' =- A, B, and j S, U,(B .14) mti' j - ... i -
which, along with the money market equilibrium condition yields 
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since we've made the simplifying assumption that the government does not 
create any money in period t. Using equation (B.15) the real bond holdings 
of individuals who trade in period tare 
_ A,S)y 8bA,S - (1 [¥l (l :tRt]}(l tt t -gt -lk){{l +(B.17) 
- (1-A)k
+ [¥l (1 :tRt]A + ~ - gt - ~k ' 
_ 8A,U) 
t t -gt - lk){{l + [¥l (1 :tRt]}(l(B.18) bA,U - y (1 t 
+ ).k
+ [¥l (1 :tRt]A + 1 - 6 gt - ).k ' 
_ 8B, S)bB,S -Y (1
t -gt - lk){{l + [¥l (l :tRt]}(l(B.19) t t 
bB,U - y (1(B.20) t t 
Rt A [~-+(l=il [~+ _ Ak }•al Rt 1 - gt - ~k 
where the D's are consumption shares as before. From the first-order 
conditions for allocating resources in period t+l: 
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i,j (1-a) i,j . B S, U, NT,(B · 21 ) mt+l - a ct+l' i - A, ' j -
and the equilibrium conditions, equations (A.13) and (A.15), the (inverse 
of) the inflation rate is given by 
Pt [~t[~t{ yt+l (l - gt+l) -1 
(B.22) -p-- 1 + R M y (1 - g - .>.k) (1 + A) ' . 
t+l t t+l t+l t 
where Mt+l - (1 + µt)Mt' with the rate of monetary growth, µt, determined by 
equation (4.11) as before. Equations (B.21) and (B.22) enable us to write 
period-t+l consumption shares as 
ao Rt ( (l-a)A _ 9A,S + a(G--{1-->.)k) }(B.23) 9A,S -{1 - +t+l (l+µt)(l+A)l + t 1-gt-.>.kl-gt+l 
9A,U _ {1 ao Rt ( A,U a(o+.>.k)(B.24) t+l - l-gt+l + (l+µt)(l+A) 1 + (1-a)A - 8t + 1-gt-.>.k } 
(B.25) OB,S - {1 +t+l 
(B.26) 
(B.27) OA, NT _ {1 _ ao } 
t+l 1-gt+l ' 
and finally 
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(B.28) 6B,NT _ {l + ao }·
t+l 1-gt+l 
Equations (B.23) to (B.26) along with the first-order condition governing 
individuals' actions in the bond market: 
(B.29) 
which can be rewritten as: 
f3R(61.,J. .)-1 - _t_El.,J• ·{((1 + µ )61.,J• .)-1}(B.30) t l+A t t t+l ' 
yield: 
A, s ~(l+µt) (l+A) { ao l (l....,.,.)A + a[ o-(1-A)k] ,(B.31) "" l+/3 R l - 1 + + l + ~6t t gt+1 1 - gt - Ak 
(B.32) 




+ Rt{1 + (1-a)A - OB' U - a:(S-Ak) } 
t 1-gt-Ak 
(B. 3S) 8A,NT = l S + Ak t + 1 - g - Ak ' 
t 
(B.36) l _ ( S + Ak J 
1 - g - Ak ' t 
and, finally, 
The expected utilities of individuals who trade are given, as before, 
by 
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i - A, B, j - S, U, 
while the expected utility of an individual who does not trade is given by 
• NT • NT [~}+ (1-a)log(l+A) + E alog 0~' + plog 0~~l + (1-a)log  ,{ 
i - A, B. Define the net private benefit of information relative to 
uninformed trading as before: 





- A, B, the net benefit of uninformed trade relative to not trading as i 
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A B
(B.41) q ' q ' 






... ) • Eti1, S _ EUi, NT 
i i
- V, ( ••• ) + 0 ( ... ). 
An equilibrium is defined as a set of.prices, allocations, and values of A's 
and q's, Ai"* and qi"* , i - A, B, such that individuals are maximized on their 
budget sets, markets clear, and 
,hi(,i*, ,j*, qi* ul"* , ... ) - 0 , 0 < Ai"* < 1(B. 43) .,, " " 
q 
i* u3"* , ... ) < 0 for Ai. E [ 0 , 1 ~i* ] 
(J(B.44) 




i i* i i* 
u i* u ' u ... ) < 0 for all u s 1-l 
i i* j* i* .*
and r (l , l , 1-l , al , ... ) .:!:: 0, 
1.* 
where the inequality holds if l - 0, for i, j - A, B, i ~ j. 
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Utility Differential as a Function of Future Government Spending 
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Utlllty Differential As a Function of Lambda and Alpha 
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